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Miller: Ely: Democracy and Distrust

BOOK REVIEWS
By John Hart Ely.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1980. Pp. viii, 268. $15.00.

DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICAL RIVEW.

Reviewed by Arthur S. Miller*
L
This book comes with impressive, possibly excessive, recommendations.
Professor Ely has set forth a theory of what he considers to be the proper function of judicial review in the United States: "judicial review under the Constitution's open-ended provisions ... can appropriately concern itself only witli
questions of participation [in the political process], and not with the substantive
merits of the political choice under attack."' In other words, the Supreme Court
should make sure that citizens can vote but it should not second-guess what the
representatives of those voters decide. To reach that conclusion he has written
183 pages of text, laden with 77 pages of notes. In Ely's view, the task of the
courts, mainly the Supreme Court of the United States, is to police the process
of representation, dear the channels of political change and facilitate the
representation of minorities.
Ely seeks to avoid the sterile argument over "activism" and "restraint" by
making judicial review compatible with democracy. His work merits attention
as more than just another contribution to the debate that since at least 1803
has been conducted over the "proper" role of federal courts vis-4-vis other governmental organs (federal and state). It deserves special attention because it
comes laden with effusive encomia. The back cover of the dust jacket has these
pronouncements:
"The most important contribution to the American theory of judicial
review written in the century." Professor Henry P. Monaghan, Cornell
Law School.
"Not in many years have I seen so stimulating and challenging a discussion of the proper bases for judicial review. Ely's dazzling intellectual
performance is a rare achievement: He manages to tackle one of our
polity's oldest problems with vigorous new insights... " Professor Gerald
Gunther, Stanford Law School.
"John Ely provides a searching re-examination of fundamental questions
And there is no voice in legal scholarship fresher, livlier, or more
lucid." Chief Judge J. Skelly Wright, United States Court of Appeals.
...

"John Ely takes a fresh and bold look at one of our oldest national
mysteries, the justification of judicial review in a democracy. He slices
away at some of my favorite legal theories, and he is devastating." Anthony Lewis, New York Times.
*Professor Emeritus of Law, The George Washington University.
1. J. ELY, DEmOCRACY AND DisTuRsT: A THEORY OF JuDiciAL REvmw 181 (1980).
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With such a pre-publication sendoff, one is temerarious indeed to venture to
analyze Ely's theory in the compass of a book review. That is especially so since
the publisher trumpets fulsomely that "[t]his powerfully argued appraisal of
judicial review may change the face of American law."
That is a huge burden for one brief book to carry. Does Democracy and
Distrust merit such praise? The answer, I think, must come on two levels. First,
when compared with the also heavily publicized Government by Judiciary, by
Raoul Berger, 2 there can be no question that Ely's work is far, far better. Comparisons may be odious, but one cannot avoid matching Ely against Berger and
concluding that Ely is easily the winner. Berger's notion of constitutional
interpretation, that the intentions of those who wrote the fundamental law
should control present-day interpretations of what they wrote, is puerile at best.
The Constitution, emphatically, is not a document frozen in time; rather, it is
a politico-legal palimpsest that permits - indeed, requires - each generation of
Americans to write its own fundamental law.
Berger, however, is a sitting duck; his preposterous views entail, in final
analysis, a dictatorship of the dead over the living. If Berger's views were followed, which they are not and indeed never have been (nor will they be), the
saints in America's hagiology, the Founding Fathers, would rule from their
graves. Whatever the mythology might be to the contrary, no nation has ever
been ruled, even partially, in such a manner. Even Soviet theoreticians have
had to develop a theory of "living Marxism" to account for all of the twistings
and turnings of Russian policies. The United States Constitution can only be
considered to be Darwinian, rather than Newtonian -as Woodrow Wilson
said almost three-quarters of a century ago.3 It is an open-ended process, not a
document frozen in time.
On a second level, however, Professor Ely does not fare so well. Although he
is an eloquent advocate who sets forth his argument in mellifluous language and
with meticulous attention to detail, the verdict on his theory, at best, must in
Scottish terms be "not proven." It is important to undersand why. In what
follows I should like to set forth a few propositions that seem to be fundamental
to any consideration of the place of judicial review in the United States. In the
main, Ely does not confront a range of "unprovided" serious constitutional
problems.
II.
It will not do, to begin, to consider only the Constitution "of the books,"
for that fundamental law, as Woodrow Wilson opined in 1885, is "manifestly
a very different thing from the Constitution in operation."4 Ely looks principally, almost solely, to the formal document - to the law in books - and has
nothing to say about the law in action. Legal educators have forgotten the
2. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1977), criticized in Miller, The Elusive Search for Values in Constitutional In-

terpretation,6 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 487 (1979).
3. W. WILSON, CONSTrIUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1908).
4. W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (1885).
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teachings of Underhill Moore and others, who a generation or so ago maintained that what officials do in fact is as important than what they say they are
doing (or supposed to do). This means that the teaching of Yick Wo v.
Hopkins5 should, when generalized, be the guiding criterion of criticism of
constitutional decisions. It is, to be sure, in the high tradition of legal scholarship to dissect and otherwise parse judicial opinions, however, that is far from
enough. To the extent that Ely concentrates on the formal, as distinguished
from the living, law- which with others is what he does - his book may be
faulted. Some time ago one of his predecessors at the Harvard Law School,
Thomas Reed Powell, quite rightly opined in discussing a Supreme Court decision on state taxation and regulation of interstate commerce that he wanted
to know who was hit and how much, rather than the sterile conceptualisms that
the Justices then purveyed. 6 I do not mean to suggest that Ely does not recognize the point, but rather that he doesn't carry his analysis far enough.
It has become fashionable to deride some judges and commentators as being
"result-oriented," a term that is never defined but seems to mean the judge or
commentator considers the matter of who wins or loses to be as important as

the rationale judges set out in their opinions. As Powell said, who is hit and
how hard is an important question. A few years ago in a neglected essay, Judge
Braxton Craven of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals maintained that all
judges are result-oriented, the only difference among them being that some
know it and some do not 7 I suggest that Judge Craven's assertion cannot be
gainsaid. Judges are not, as Chief Justice Marshall once maintained, "mere
instruments of the law;" they exercise a personal will. Not that they admit as
much. Neither they nor most commentators are quite willing to face up to what
Professor Ray Forrester has called "truth in judging." s Rather, as Judge
Learned Hand once put it, when invalidating governmental acts judges "do
not, indeed may not say that, taking all things into consideration, the [action]
is too strong for the judicial stomach. On the contrary, they wrap their veto in
a protective veil of adjectives such as 'arbitrary', 'artificial', 'normal', 'reasonable', 'inherent', 'fundamental', or 'essential', whose office usually, though quite
innocently, is to disguise what they are doing and impute it to a derivation far
more impressive than their personal preferences, which are all in fact that lie
behind the decision." Just how "innocent" judges are about that type of activity
is not quite as clear to all as it was to Judge Hand. Holmes once said that judges
tend to be "naif, simple-minded" people who need a touch of Mephistopheleslo
- which leads one to wonder what company he kept. Judges in general are
hard-nosed realists, fully aware of what they are doing, and in fact wanting to
do it. Not for nothing did Chief Justice Taft say, in his dotage, that it was
5. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
6. See T. PowE.L, VAGARIES AND VARmIrEs iN CoNTroNrA. INTERPRErAmON passim (1956).
7. Craven, Paean to Pragmatism, 50 N.C.L. REv. 977 (1972). See Miller & Howell, The
Myth of Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 27 U. Cn. L. REv. 661 (1960), reprintedin,
A. MumE, Tm SuPREME COURT: MYT AND REALTY (1978).
8. Forrester, Are We Ready for Truth in Judging?; 63 A.B.A.J. 1212 (1977). See A. MmImR,
supranote 12, ch. 4.
9. L. HAND, THE Bum or RIGHS 70 (1958).
10. 0. HoLmS, COLLEcrE LEGAL PAP.Rs 295 (1920).
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vitally important for him and like-minded judges to remain in office in order
to help fend off the "Bolsheviki.""' l
All of this should be part of the given in any discourse on judical review.
The absence of such considerations is vivid testimony to the prevalence of the
basic ideology of American lawyers, "legalism," by which is meant that the law
is considered to be the "there," separate and apart from the politics and economics of everyday life. That there is no there, there; as Gertrude Stein once
acidly described Oakland, California, should be obvious to all. But it is not. As
any sociologist of law knows, and as all lawyers should know, the State and
legal system are closely intertwined.
Professor Ely seeks to reconcile judicial review with democracy. This would
seem to require some detailed attention to what is meant by the word "democracy." He asserts, perhaps correctly, that Americans "have as a society from the
beginning and now almost instinctively, accepted the notion that a representative democracy must be our form of government." 12 Well and good, one might
say, but that assertion leaves dangling and unanswered the crucial questions of
what Ely means by "democracy" and by "representation." By no means are
those words self defining. I do not suggest that he is bemused by those words;
but do say that this book does not adequately set forth the complexities of the
terms. After all, democracy has some 200 different definitions; and representation is by no means a simple concept. 18
Ely maintains there has never been "any serious challenge to the general
notion of majoritarian control," quoting Professor Robert Dahl's observation
that "rule by an aristocracy, even in modern dress, is not what Americans have
ever wanted.' 14 However, that does not get to the core of the question: Is it
what Americans want? Or is "rule by an aristocracy" what they have? More
precisely, is it what they are entirely willing to put up with? Majoritarian democracy is at once too simplistic and therefore erroneous because it fails to
consider the ultimate question: Who in fact governs? Although a disagreeable
and nasty fact of life, elites govern the United States. As Maurice Duverger has
said, the most that "people" can do is to elect the elite who govern them; 15 who
in turn, promulgate policies which are not necessarily in consonance with
wishes of the majority. I do not suggest there is any such thing as the people
or the public as a discrete entity in the United States. At best, as Professor
Grant McConnell notes, there are congeries of "publics," each one individually
pursuing narrow ends without regard to the overall "public interest."16
In final analysis, judicial review by an oligarchic Court cannot be reconciled with democracy (however defined). I think it is futile to try to do so.
11.
12.

II H. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 967 (1939).
J. ELY, supra note 1, at 5.

13. See M. REJAI, DEMOCRACY: THE CONTEMPORARY THEORIES
(1967). See also
E. SCHATrscHNEEDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE 130-31 (1960). On representation, see NoMos
X: REPRESENTATION (1968).
14. J. ELY, supra note 1, at 7, quoting R. DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 493 (3d

ed. 1976).
15. M. DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES: THEIR ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY IN THE MODERN
STATE 425 (1961).
16.

G. MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 339, 361 and passim (1966).
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Possibly that is the reason Professor Ely devotes only a few pages to set forth
his views of democracy. Had he probed further he would have run hard against
the immovable wall of elitism in a nation that trumpets that it is a "representative democracy." I think Ely knows this; what puzzles me is why he doesn't say
so, save in a brief passing comment.
Professor Ely gives only cursory attention to a fact that invalidates much of
his argument- the manifest illiberality of the "masses." Everyone knows, or
should know, of the many efforts that have been made to get Mr. T. C. Mitsir
to sign a petition repeating the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of
Rights and how those efforts have foundered.
The elected representatives of "the people" may not only be prone to
egregious error but also can be vindictively harsh. An example of the latter is
Rummel v. Estelle,18 decided on March 18, 1980 by a 5 to 4 split on the Supreme
Court. Justice William Rehnquist, speaking for the Chief Justice and Justices
Blackmun, Stewart and White, held that a Texas statute making life imprisonment mandatory on a third felony conviction was not cruel and unusual punishment proscribed by the Constitution. Rummel had pleaded guilty in 1964
to forging checks for $28.86 and in 1969 to using a stolen credit card to purchase four tires worth $80.00; both offenses are felonies under Texas law. When
he was convicted in 1978 of another felony -accepting a $120.75 check to repair an air conditioner with no intention of doing the work -he was committed for life. Justice Rehnquist stated that the Texas statute not only made
"criminal the unlawful acquisition of another person's property" but also dealt
in "a harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have shown they
are simply incapable of conforming to the norms of society as established by its
criminal law. (If that means what it says, it means that a 36-year-old man
always fails to conform to the norms of society - a proposition which even the
redoubtable Justice Rehnquist might be constrained to deny.) Rehnquist went
further: the law is "nothing more than a societal decision that when such a
person commits yet another felony, he should be subjected to the admittedly
serious penalty of incarceration for life, subject only to the state's judgment as
to whether to grant him parole." I read Ely to say that he would agree with
Rehnquist that a 128-year-old statute is valid, even though the sums (in this day
of runaway inflation) amounted to a total of $229.11.
Of course, the Texas law is "nothing more" than a decision to imprison for
life- but that is the question, not a reason for upholding the statute. It will
not do for a person to be jailed for life for three penny ante offenses, particularly when the learned Justice speaks in circles and conclusions and uses
questions for reasons. Ely confronts the basic problem by quoting Dean Wellington's hypothetical in his brief concluding chapter. To Wellington, "a statute
making it a crime for any person to remove another person's gall bladder, except to save that person's life," would surely be unconstitutional.19 Ely "solves"
17. T. C. Mits is my name for the celebrated man in the street; I first used the appellation in Miller, The ConstitutionalLaw of the "Security State," 10 STAN. L. REv. 620 (1958).
18. 100 S. Ct. 1133 (1980).
19. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes

on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 304-05 (1973), quoted in J. ELY, supra note 1, at 182.
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that problem by avoiding it: he maintains that such a gall bladder law
"couldn't pass." Ely is concerned with decisions being made "democratically"
and also in reducing "the likelihood that a different set of rules is effectively
being applied to the comparatively powerless."
Well and good, so far as it goes. But how far does it really go? Ely's position
has the ring of Anatole France's pungent observation about the law which, in
its magnificent equality forbids the rich as well as the poor from begging for
bread and sleeping under bridges. I am not suggesting that Rummel should not
be punished. Quite the contrary. It is the degree of punishment that is at issue.
Assuming the Texas law was democractically enacted, is it enough merely to
ask whether it is being uniformly applied? I do not thing so and it is on
precisely that point that Ely's analysis is most vulnerable. Ely wrestles with the
basic problem in a brief discussion of capital punishment, but it must be said
that he loses the wrestling match. He is obviously concerned about the death
penalty, particularly with its oft-times capriciousness, but has to justify the mass
killing of several hundred people - one by one. To be sure, a number of persons on death row seem to raise the same nasty questions about John Spenkelink, the man the state of Florida killed recently. Spenkelink's death was involuntary on his part; shooting Gary Gilmore does not count, since Gilmore
asked Utah to do it. A book published in 1980 that fails to note the hundreds
of people now sitting on Death Rows awaiting execution simply does not come
to grips with anything more than the basics of a representation-reinforcing
model of judicial review.
In my scale of values, life imprisonment in a Texas jail is on a level with,
perhaps worse than, summary execution. For Rummel to have to face an untold
number of years in durance vile offends a sense of justice to which any polity
committed to constitutionalism adheres. What values are furthered, what useful purpose is served, by that type of Draconian punishment? One would hope
that the governor of Texas would have the decency to do something about the
sentence, by reducing it to make the punishment fit the crimes. So, too, should
the Texas legislature examine its statute to bring it into the twentieth cenury.
Failing that, is it too much to ask of the Supreme Court - at least, the five-man
majority - that a measure of compassion enter into their decisions? I think not.
Nor is it too much to ask of Professor Ely to provide in his general theory for
such cases, whether they be Wellington's gall bladder case or Rummel v.
Estelle. It is simply not enough to say, as Ely does about Wellington, that no
legislature would enact such a statute. Texas and two other states have such
statutes, and they are being applied.
Professor Ely quite correctly points out some of the shortcomings of
pluralism, and for that reason he calls for judicial action to facilitate the representation of minorities. He thus makes judicial review compatible, in his
mind, with democratic theory. His analysis and explication on this topic are
among the more obscure parts of this book. Should "discrete and insular"
minorities be given some sort of special judicial protection? The question has
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been argued since Justice Stone's famed footnote in United States v. Carolene
ProductsCo.20

It is difficult for me to see why Ely's view that the Court can and should help
correct the faults of pluralism should not be accepted. But should the Court do
more? Should it rule where legislatures have failed to do so? It is on that precise
point where some would depart from Ely.
I do because, even if the Court opens the avenues of representation, there is
no reason to conclude the legislative products will in fact serve the "democratic"
purpose. Ely's answer to the assertion that Congress and legislatures are really
not democratic is that means should be found to make them more so. Well,
maybe. That position assumes too much; Jacques Ellul in The Political Illusion2 l maintained that legislatures function today solely for the purpose of
putting the decisions of pressure groups and of the experts into statutory form.
If that be so, and I think it is, then it must be recognized that reforms such as
Ely advocates do not seem to be adequate. An additional push at times is
needed. That can come from the Supreme Court by the Justices recognizing, as
at times they have in the past, that the Constitution is not only a framework of
government and a little code of thou-shalt-nots aimed at governmental officers
but that it also encompasses what those officers must do. The Constitution is
more than a set of negative limitations; it also has an affirmative, a positive
dimension. For example, due process of law not only limits official action
(whether procedurally or substantively), but also as Chief Justice Hughes once
said, requiresgovernmental action.22

Professor Ely does not tackle the question of presidential power and how the
Court should react to given instances of challenges to exercise of that power.
How does his general theory apply to such well-know cases as the Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,23 United States v. Midwest Oil Co.,24 United States
27
26
v. Nixon,2 5 Myers v. United States, the Prize Cases, and Ex parte Milligan?28
There are more, of course, but these suffice to show the problem exists. I find
nothing in Democracy and Distrust that would be of help to a judge (or a
commentator) who had to decide on the validity of those presidential actions.
Ely's theory does not reach that far, even though it is generally conceded that

there has been an immense increase in the actual powers of the President since
1789. One need only cite the challenges to several Presidental acts during the
Vietnam fiasco, raising serious constitutional questions which the Supreme
Court refused to entertain.
I suppose if one accepts the debatable proposition, as perhaps Ely does, that
20. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n. 4 (1938). Professor Ely devotes considerable attention to this

footnote; there are nine references to it in his index.
21. J. Eu. UL, THE POLITICAL ILLUSION (1967).
22. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937). See generally A. Mumm,
SOCIAL CHANGE AND FUNDAMENTAL LAw: AMERICA'S EVOLVING CONSTITUTION

(1979).

23. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
24. 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
25. 418 US. 683 (1974).
26. 272 US. 52 (1926).

27. 67 US. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
28. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
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the Constitution places ultimate power within the national government in the
Congress, then one could argue that Congress, by not taking measures to constrain the President, has in effect ratified those disputed actions. There is in
fact some authority in that regard, dealing with the Vietnam conflict. Ely does
say, in connection with a brief discussion of Congress and the bureaucracy, that
"[c]ourts ... should ensure not only that administrators follow ...
legislative
policy directions ... but also that such directions are given." 29 In essence, this

is a call for a return to the "nondelegation" doctrine that flourished in the
1930s but has since been largely ignored. Justice Marshall called the doctrine
"moribund" in 1974. It may not be dead, but surely it is in a state of suspended
animation. Other commentators maintain it should be resurrected and employed.
That, however, applies to the bureaucrat, not to America's "elected king."
A theory of judicial review in the era of executive hegemony in government
surely should take into consideration those very real problems of possible
excessive and improper exercises of power by the President. To mention one
example not yet litigated: Is President Carter's 1978 executive order concerning wiretapping for national security reasons valid? Ely's general theory gives
neither the answer nor even a way to approach such a question. I suggest elsewhere that "presidential government has come to stay," 30 a proposition which
if only partially accurate surely calls for a theory of judicial review of presidential actions.
Nor does Professor Ely address the difficult problems of federalism. For example, he does not tell us whether the decisions in Rizzo v. Goode23 and Paul
v. Davis,3 2 fit into his general theory. He does criticize National League of
Cities v. Usery33 in a footnote and thus certainly is fully aware of the general
problem. Rizzo, Paul and Usery all pay utmost deference to "states' rights,"
which is mildly amusing because they come at precisely the time when economic
and technological imperatives are eliminating diversity and not only making
the nation indivisible but also contributing greatly to the growing obsolescence
of the nation-state as a form of political order. Justice Rehnquist and cohorts
stand like King Canute, commanding the tides of change to cease. Federalism
may have been the price paid for the Document of 1787, but it is a debt long
since discharged.
One trouble I find with Democracy and Distrust is that here, as elsewhere,
Ely does not place the legal doctrines he discusses in socio-economic context.
The Constitution, as with all law, does not exist in a vacuum. A contextual
analysis would have aided in refining Ely's theory. Possibly, in issues of federalism and presidential power, it would have exploded it. So, too, with history.
Perhaps Ely deliberately left that out, assuming, probably correctly, that his
readers would be privy to most of the relevant historical insights.
29. J.ELY, supra note 1, at 133.
30. Miller, Reason of State and the Emergent Constitution of Control, 64 MINN. L. REv.
585, 628 (1980). See also Miller, Constitutional Law: Crisis Government Becomes the Norm, 39
OHIO STATE

L.J. 736 (1978); A.MILLER,

PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A NUTSHELL

(1977).

31. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
32. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
33. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). J.ELY, supra note 1,at 224 n. 44.
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The problems of private governance are not discussed. Surely we know
enough by now to realize that Americans are governed as much by large corporate entities such as business corporations, unions, universities, churches and
foundations, as they are by the avowedly public organs. The Supreme Court as
an authoritative spokesman in political theory has sporadically approached and
occasionally receded from, tackling the ticklish question of whether constitutional norms should apply to ostensibly private groups. Professor David Ewing
of the Harvard Business School, among others, thinks that they should. 4 Can
Ely's general theory be applied to representation in those groups? In some respects the Court already has done so. In the White Primary Cases 5 it held that
the Democratic Party cannot prevent blacks from voting in primary elections.
Surely that is "representation-reinforcing."
But Ely does not get to such cases as Marsh v. Alabama or the Sit-in Cases.30
Are we to infer that here, as elsewhere, judicial action was improper? Does he
agree with the decisions of Lloyd v. Tanner,37 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co.,3 8 and Hudgens v. NLRB?39 He of course is fully entitled to take any position on those decisions that he wishes. My suggestion is that a "general theory"
should take that dimension of constitutionalism into account. Illustratively,
should we be permitted to vote for the president and board of directors of
AT&T?
Much the same may be said for constitutional problems of adapting an
essentially domestic Constitution to existence in the "global village." Some of
these questions, of course, involve the power of the President. Are we to be left
to Professor Paul Freund's belief that a thoroughgoing commitment to multinationalism requires a constitutional amendment? 40 Or can the Constitution be
adapted by time-honored means (not only amendment but judicial decision and
customs and usage) to the exigencies of life on "Spaceship Earth"? Larger than
national resolutions of American public policy questions are already being
made. Examples include the International Monetary Fund, NATO, and international commodity agreements. The list is not long, but it is significant. Is
judicial action conceivably affecting those relationships to be considered undemocratic and thus improper? This Ely does not tell us.
Finally, I come to the nature of the adversary system itself and of the competence of the personnel who man it ("judge and company," as Benthan said).41
Are the system and the personnel capable of updating the Constitution even in
34. D. EWING, FREmoM INSME THM ORGANIZATION (1977). See Miller, A Modest Proposal
for Helping to Tame the Corporate Beast, 8 HoFsTRA L. REv. (1979); Miller, Toward "Constitutionalizing" the Corporation:A Speculative Essay, 80 W. VA. L. Rxv. 187 (1978).
35. E.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
36. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). An example of the Sit-in Cases is Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226

(1964).
57. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
38. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
39. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
40.

Freund, Law and the Future: ConstitutionalLaw, 51 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 187, 194-95 (1956).

41. See Miller &Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REv. 1187 (1975), reprinted in
A. Mimur, supra note 12.
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the limited way that Professor Ely advocates? Without essaying an answer to
that crucial question, surely it may be said that a theory of judicial review
should look to the mechanism itself. That Professor Ely does not do.
In:.
My reservations about this volume should not be taken to mean that it is
not a disciplined, first-class exposition of a segment of one of the enduring
problems of the American political order. Democracy and Distrust should be
required reading for every law student and every student of government. The
prose, while quite readable, is too dense for Mr. T. C. Mits42- or even for the
person who gets his books via the Book of the Month Club.
Those who either attack or defend judicial review will have to come to
terms with Ely's thesis. The book deserves a wide readership. The encomia
printed on the dust jacket can, it seems to me, be attributed to the publishers'
propensity to see masterpieces in every book they issue. This is not a masterpiece; it will not "change the face of American law." But it does make one think
through and examine his own beliefs. Professor Ely merits high marks, perhaps
even as a candidate for Hand's "Society of Jobbists."43 Ely beats Raoul Berger
going away, and challenges those who disagree with his general theory to produce a better one. That is no mean achievement."
42. See note 17 supra.
43. The Society of Jobbists is "that strange cult ... which 'undertakes only those jobs
which the members can do in proper workmanlike fashion' ..... It demands right quality,
better than the market will pass." Kurland, Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government, 78 HARV. L. Rav. 143, 144-45 (1964).
44. It should be mentioned that Ely says, "[t]he elaborationof a representation-reinforcing
theory of judicial review could go many ways, and Chapters 5 and 6 [on "clearing the channels
of political change" and "facilitating the representation of minorities'" are obviously just one
version." J. ELY, supra note I, at 181 (emphasis added). But he also calls it a "general theory,"
id. (emphasis added), that is limited only to questions of participation in the political
process. Until he can adequately answer Dean Wellington's hypothetical case, supra note 24, or
Rummel v. Estelle, see text accompanying notes 18-19 supra, the "general theory" is faulty. He
has also, as said in the text of this review, to confront many other "unprovided" cases.
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